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VAPT · Application security · Cloud posture · Compliance readiness
A report with four hundred findings and no order of work is a document, not a result. We test, rank by what an attacker would actually reach, help your developers fix it, then retest and say what changed.
The problem
Very few incidents in small and mid-sized businesses begin with a novel technique. They begin somewhere ordinary. An API endpoint that checks whether you are logged in but not whether the record belongs to you, so changing a number in the URL returns another customer's invoice. A staff account that kept its permissions after the person left. A database backup sitting in object storage that was made public during a migration and never changed back.
The second common origin is credentials. A password reused across a personal account and an admin panel, no second factor, and a login page with no rate limiting. Nothing in that chain requires skill to exploit, and all of it is visible from outside.
The third is the supply chain: a dependency two years out of date with a published exploit, a WordPress plugin nobody owns, an integration key with far more access than the integration needs, and a vendor account that was never offboarded.
This matters for how testing should be scoped. A generic vulnerability scan reliably finds outdated software and misses every one of the authorisation problems above, because those require understanding what your application is supposed to allow. That understanding is the part worth paying for.
What is included
7 areas of work. Most engagements start with one or two and widen once the first release is in use.
Grey-box testing of web applications, APIs, mobile apps and external infrastructure against the OWASP Top 10 and API Top 10, with manual testing of business logic and authorisation, which is where the findings that matter usually live.
Authentication and session handling, object-level and function-level authorisation, input validation, file upload paths, rate limiting, mass assignment and the endpoints that were built for an integration and quietly exposed everything.
Reading the code alongside the tests, targeted at authentication, authorisation, cryptography, query construction, secret handling and dependency use. Catches the classes of problem black-box testing cannot see, including flaws in code paths that are not yet reachable.
AWS, Azure and GCP configuration reviewed against real exposure: public storage, permissive security groups, over-broad IAM roles, unencrypted volumes, absent logging, and long-lived access keys that should be short-lived federated credentials.
Who has access to what and why, multi-factor enforcement, service account inventory, secrets moved out of code and configuration files into a managed store, and a written joiner-mover-leaver process, because dormant accounts are a recurring root cause.
Security moved into the pipeline: dependency and container scanning, secret detection, static analysis with the noise tuned out, and a threat-modelling habit for new features. Plus practical training for your developers on the specific issues found in your code.
Gap assessment against the control set, evidence collection, policy drafting and remediation planning. We prepare you for an audit and we do not perform certification, which is done by an accredited body and cannot be granted by an engineering partner.
How we work
Findings come with evidence, a reproduction path and a severity that reflects your context rather than a generic score. A cross-site scripting issue in an internal admin tool used by four people is not the same risk as the same class of bug on a public signup form, and a report that grades both identically forces your team to do the triage we were paid to do.
Each finding names the fix, not just the flaw, with a code-level or configuration-level recommendation your developers can act on. Where a fix is architectural and expensive, we say that and describe a mitigation that reduces exposure while the real change is planned.
Retesting is included and it is what makes the engagement worth something. After remediation we verify each finding and issue an updated report stating what is fixed, what is partially addressed and what remains open with an accepted-risk note. That document is the one your enterprise customer or insurer will actually ask to see.
In practice
Findings come with evidence, a reproduction path and a severity that reflects your context rather than a generic score. A cross-site scripting issue in an internal admin tool used by four people is not the same risk as the same class of bug on a public signup form, and a report that grades both identically forces your team to do the triage we were paid to do.
Where it comes up
Stack
We pick from a stack we actually run in production. Where your team already has a preference and it is a reasonable fit, we work in yours instead of arguing for ours.
Sector context
Domain knowledge shortens discovery. These are the sectors where we already understand the vocabulary and the failure modes, so the first version of the build is closer to right.
Appointments, records, billing and reporting, where patient data handling and clinical workflow set the constraints before anything is designed.
Lot and parcel movement, job-work with karigars, grading records and the reconciliation that follows a stone through five pairs of hands.
Shift-based production data, downtime causes, quality records and the daily gap between what the ERP holds and what the floor actually did.
We have not published a case study for this service yet. When we do, it will name the client with written permission and quote numbers the client can defend. Nothing else is worth reading.
Until then, the useful version of proof is a conversation about your problem. Ask us how we would approach it, what we would refuse to do, and where the estimate is soft.
Ask about comparable workQuestions
A scan is automated. It compares what it can see against a database of known issues and is good at finding outdated software and obvious misconfiguration. A penetration test includes a person who understands what your application is meant to permit, which is the only way to find authorisation flaws, business logic abuse and chained issues that no scanner recognises. Most of the findings that lead to real breaches in business software fall in the second category.
It should not, and we design the engagement so it cannot happen by accident. Testing is normally done against a staging environment that mirrors production, destructive techniques such as denial of service are excluded unless explicitly requested and scheduled, rate limits are agreed in the rules of engagement, and you have a contact who can tell us to stop at any point. Where production must be tested, we agree a window and a rollback plan first.
Annually as a baseline, after any significant architectural change, and before a major release that exposes new surface. Continuous scanning in the pipeline sits between those, catching dependency and configuration drift without waiting for the next engagement. A test is a snapshot of one moment, and treating a year-old report as current status is a common and expensive misunderstanding.
No, and be cautious of anyone who says they can while also doing your engineering. Certification is issued by an accredited certification body or a licensed audit firm, and independence is the point of it. What we do is the readiness work: gap assessment, control implementation, evidence collection and policy drafting, so that when the auditor arrives the findings are minor.
We stop and tell you the same day rather than saving it for the report. Critical findings, particularly anything indicating active exposure or a possible existing compromise, are communicated immediately with the evidence and an interim mitigation you can apply while the proper fix is planned. This is agreed in the rules of engagement before testing starts, including who we contact and how.
Both, and they are usually separate phases so the testing stays honest. Remediation support ranges from working through findings with your developers to implementing fixes ourselves where the code is in our scope. Where we wrote the code, we will say so plainly in the report rather than quietly grading our own work.
Works well with
Send a paragraph about what is not working today. You will get a written reply from someone who would be on the build, covering how we would approach it, roughly what a first phase looks like, and whether cybersecurity is even the right place to spend the budget.
What happens next
